Publications

In this episode of Shielded: The Last Line of Cyber Defense, host Johannes Lintzen sits down with Dr. Garfield Jones from CISA to dive into the practical steps for post-quantum migration, making the case that waiting until 2035 is far too late.

In this episode of Shielded: we speak with Hart Montgomery, Technical Director at LF Decentralized Trust, about how outdated cryptographic dependencies, hidden vulnerabilities, and poor crypto agility are putting critical systems at risk.

Shielded welcomes Dustin Moody, the mathematician leading NIST's post-quantum cryptography standardization project, for an in-depth discussion on why organizations must act now.

In this episode, Johannes Lintzen welcomes Rolfe Schmidt, Research Engineer at Signal Messenger, to explore how one of the world's most privacy-focused messaging platforms implemented PQC.

Formal verification has become increasingly important in the realm of cryptographic primitives, which serve as the foundational elements of secure communication systems. As cryptographic  algorithms underpin the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of digital information, any flaw in their implementation can lead to catastrophic security breaches. 

In the premier episode of Shielded: The Last Line of Cyber Defense, host Johannes Lintzen is joined by Bas Westerbaan, Cloudflare, to discuss why organizations must act now on post-quantum cryptography.

In this article, we’ll explore some of the key considerations to be made when it comes to the comparison of open source with commercially-licensed IP.

With the world relying increasingly on digital payments, online authorization, and cloud-based access, we need cryptography to be smarter and more prescient than ever.

We propose a recursive lattice reduction framework for finding short non-zero vectors or dense sublattices of a lattice.

In this work, we formally prove a tight security bound for SPHINCS+ using the EasyCrypt proof assistant, establishing greater confidence in the general security of the scheme and that of the parameter sets considered for standardization.

We construct an efficient dynamic group signature (or more generally an accountable ring signature) from isogeny and lattice assumptions.

In this work we prove lower bounds on the (communication) cost of maintaining a shared key among a dynamic group of users. Being "dynamic'' means one can add and remove users from the group.